Prejudgment Attachment of Foreign Sovereign Assets Under the Proposed Amendments to the Foreign Sovereignty Immunities Act by Foresta, Stephen G.
Fordham International Law Journal
Volume 9, Issue 2 1985 Article 4
Prejudgment Attachment of Foreign Sovereign
Assets Under the Proposed Amendments to
the Foreign Sovereignty Immunities Act
Stephen G. Foresta∗
∗
Copyright c©1985 by the authors. Fordham International Law Journal is produced by The Berke-
ley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj
Prejudgment Attachment of Foreign Sovereign
Assets Under the Proposed Amendments to
the Foreign Sovereignty Immunities Act
Stephen G. Foresta
Abstract
This Note will focus on the proposed amendment contained in S.1071 that would strengthen
prejudgment attachment of foreign assets. Part I will discuss the doctrine of sovereign immunity
as it has developed in this country, and its present status in the field of United States international
litigation. Part II of the Note will examine the prejudgment attachment remedy in light of these
sovereign immunity developments. Part III will analyze the proposed amendment dealing with
prejudgment attachment. Finally, the Note will conclude that the United States Congress should
adopt the proposed judgment provision. By doing so, Congress would remove a formidable ob-
stacle from international litigation, and thus enable many private claimants to ensure a meaningful
discovery.
PREJUDGMENT ATTACHMENT OF FOREIGN
SOVEREIGN ASSETS UNDER THE PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS TO THE FOREIGN
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT
INTRODUCTION
Prejudgment attachment' of foreign sovereign assets in
the United States is severely restricted under current sovereign
immunities law,2 thus leaving private litigants highly suscepti-
1. Attachment is a remedy that imposes a lien upon property of the defendants
to secure the satisfaction of a judgment. 14A CYCLOPEDIA OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE
§ 71.03 (3rd ed. 1984). Prejudgment attachment (often referred to as simply "at-
tachment") is a lien imposed prior to any proceedings on the merits of the dispute.
See Cordoba Shipping Co., Ltd. v. Maro Shipping Ltd., 494 F. Supp. 183 (D. Conn.
1980).
For purposes of this Note the term "attachment" will include the concept of
garnishment as well. Garnishment is a species of attachment that allows seizure of
the assets held by a third party. See United States v. Thornton, 672 F.2d 101, 105
(D.C. Cir. 1982). Attachment and garnishment are basically similar. See R. HAYDOCK,
D. HERR &J. STEMPEL, FUNDAMENTALS OF PRETRIAL LITIGATION 533 (1985). Garnish-
ment differs from attachment, however, in that the latter usually requires posting of a
bond. Id.
Prejudgment attachment is statutory in c-igin. See Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Gleave,
540 F. Supp. 81, 83 (W.D.N.Y. 1982). It is also in derogation of the common law and
its traditional rule that a person should be afforded a proper adjudication of his
rights before his property is taken. See infra note 117. Courts will often use this fact
to justify strict construction of the prejudgment attachment statutes against those
who seek the remedy. Ashland Oil, 540 F. Supp. at 83. There is no federal procedural
rule governing prejudgment attachment. Under Rule 64 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, FED. R. CIv. P. 64, attachment of property for the purpose of securing
satisfaction of an anticipated judgment is subject to the law of the state in which the
federal district court hearing the particular case is seated. See Granny Goose Foods,
Inc. v. Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423, 436 n.10 (1974). Prejudgment attachment is gov-
erned in New York by article 62 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules. N.Y. CIv. PRAC.
LAW §§ 6201-6225 (McKinney 1980). When neither federal statute nor state law au-
thorizes prejudgment attachment, it cannot be obtained by virtue of Rule 64. See
DeBeers Consolidated Mines, Ltd. v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 218 (1945).
Prejudgment remedies are also subject to any applicable United States statute
and to constitutional limtations. 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE § 2932 (1973). For instance, numerous state prejudgment attachment
statutes were challenged in the past on the grounds that they violated the debtor's
due process rights. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, reh 'g denied, 409 U.S. 902
(1972) (prejudgment repossession statute held unconstitutional absent notice, op-
portunity for hearing or judicial participation); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,
395 U.S. 337 (1969) (due process clause forbids prejudgment garnishment of wages
absent notice and prior hearing).
2. The grant or denial of sovereign immunity in the United States is governed
by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as FSIA or Act]. See infra notes 14-17 and accompanying text (gen-
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ble to "hit and run" tactics of an unfriendly foreign govern-
ment.3 The sovereign immunities law should be revised to
correct this deficiency in light of the importance of prejudg-
ment attachment in international litigation.4
Prejudgment attachment is a provisional remedy which al-
lows a claimant to secure the payment, before trial, of any
judgment that may eventually be awarded.5 In essence, this
remedy ensures the effectiveness of the judicial process.6 If a
eral discussion of the FSIA). Section 16 10(d) of the Act specifies the limited circum-
stances under which prejudgment attachment of foreign sovereign assets will be per-
mitted. See infra note 134 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 135-39 and accompanying text. A claimant's greatest fear in a
suit against a foreign party is that the latter may remove all of its assets, not only from
the jurisdiction, but also from the country. Removal of assets would prevent the
claimant from enforcing its judgment because the defendant would have no assets to
satisfy that judgment. Claimants can often prevent private foreign parties from re-
moving assets prior to judgment by attaching those assets. See supra note 1. This
remedy, however, is virtually unavailable in an action brought against a foreign sov-
ereign or sovereign agency. See infra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
4. International litigation is the by-product of a modern and sophisticated com-
mercial world that is economically interdependent, but also prone to disruptions and
other changes that frequently bring about disputes. Burrows & Newman, Preudgment
Attachment-Sovereign Immunity, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 23, 1982, at 1, col. 1. As a result, pri-
vate parties must rely upon a judicial system that can guarantee a proper remedy
when these inevitable disputes arise.
5. See supra note 1; see also S.F. KNEELAND, LAW OF ATTACHMENT (1884).
An attachment against property may be termed the preliminary arrest
of the defendant's property for the eventual satisfaction of the plaintiffs
claim.
The distinguishing feature of an attachment process arises from the fact
that by it the goods of a debtor are seized before he has an opportunity to
be heard upon the alleged indebtedness, and before its validity has been
judicially tested by a trial or determined by a judgment of the court. In its
nature and effect it may, therefore, be designated as an anticipatory levy,
whereby the property of the defendant is seized, pendente lite, as security for
the enforcement of the proposed judgment.
Id. at 2-3 (footnotes omitted). The prejudgment attachment process begins when the
claimant satisfies the statutory requirements and obtains a writ of attachment. Under
most statutes, once the claimant has obtained a writ of attachment he then delivers it
to the sheriff. The sheriff levies on the property to be attached by physically seizing
it. If size or some other factor prevents actual seizure, the sheriff may constructively
seize the property by disabling it so that the defendant may not use it. Once the
sheriff levies on the property, the claimant acquires a security interest in the attached
property. See R. HAYDOCK, D. HERR &J. STEMPEL, supra note 1, at 532. "This security
lien will have priority over certain other creditors' claims, depending upon the nature
of the other claims and their timing." Id.
6. See generally 7J. MOORE &J. LUCAS, FEDERAL PRACTICE, 64.04, 64.04[3] (2d
ed. 1985) (main goal of provisional remedy statutes is "to provide security, by im-
pounding the defendant's assets, as an incident to a legal claim and for the purpose
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defendant removes his assets from the jurisdiction, or other-
wise disposes of his assets in order to defraud a potential credi-
tor, any judgment subsequently obtained is likely to result in a
Pyrrhic victory. Prejudgment attachment of a defendant's as-
sets prevents this frustration of the claimant's award.7
Prejudgment attachment is a vital weapon on the claim-
ant's side in any litigation.8 However, when the defendant is a
foreign government, or an agency of a foreign government,
prejudgment attachment is effectively unavailable. 9
Traditional procedural rules no longer apply when the de-
fendant is a foreign sovereign entity,'0 and the dispute takes
of assuring collection of a judgment at 'law' "); 7A J. WEINSTEIN, H. KORN & A.
MILLER, NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE, 6201.01 (1985) (an attachment will serve to
protect the claimant's prospective judgment "when it seems likely that the plaintiff, if
successful on the merits, will have difficulty enforcing the judgment unless the con-
tinued availability of the defendant's property for enforcement purposes is assured").
7. See supra note 1; see also infra note 116.
8. See Kheel, New York's Amended Attachment Statute: A Prejudgment Remedy in Need of
Further Revision, 44 BROOKLYN L. REV. 199, 200-04 (1978). Not only does prejudg-
ment attachment ensure payment of a prospective award, it also prevents the defend-
ant from making full use of the assets during the litigation. This result can have an
obvious and powerful coercive effect on the defendant. As one commentator ex-
plained, "[a]ttachment requires the defendant to disgorge the 'family jewels' pendente
lite. Time is no longer the defendant's ally; rather, it is the defendant who, having
lost the benefit of the treasure before the day of judgment, may seek to expedite
matters in order to have his property returned." Id. at 201.
The claimant thus possesses an enormous amount of leverage over the defend-
ant, who faces the possibility of having his assets tied up for an extended period of
time. Attachment may pressure the defendant into an unfavorable settlement, per-
haps even in a lawsuit that may lack any substantive merit. Id.
9. See infra notes 134-41 and accompanying text. Under section 1610(d) of the
FSIA the foreign sovereign entity must explicitly waive its sovereign immunity before
a claimant can attach sovereign assets prior to judgment.
10. See Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts in Suits Against Foreign States: Hearings Before the
Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House of Representatives
Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 11315, 94th Cong. 2nd Sess. (1976) [hereinafter
cited as 1976 Hearings]. Actions in which the defendant is a foreign sovereign or
sovereign entity are particularly prevalent in the area of raw materials and in cartel
situations. Id. at 71 (quoting a letter form Timothy W. Stanley, President, Interna-
tional Economic Policy Association, to Hon. Walter Flowers, Chairman, Subcommit-
tee on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations, Committee on the Judiciary,
U.S. House of Representatives (June 24, 1976)). Government-operated firms now
predominate in the oil industries of many developing countries. National agricul-
tural marketing boards have increased their roles in grain trade, and in the shipping
industry many developing countries are buying national fleets which are operated as
government-run monopolies. Id.
While centrally-planned trade is most visible in socialist economies, see infra note
65 and accompanying text, it is by no means limited to those governments. Even the
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on a greater complexity. Claims between a private claimant
and a foreign sovereign entity are governed by what has been
referred to as "the hoary doctrine of sovereign immunity,"'" a
time-honored rule of law that grants states and other interna-
tional legal persons certain immunities from the exercise ofju-
risdiction.' 2 This doctrine, however, conflicts with the equally
important notion that every private citizen that enters into a
commercial transaction with a foreign party should be assured
of legal redress.'
3
Congress passed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
19761 (FSIA or Act) to strike a balance between the foreign
sovereign seeking immunity and the private claimant seeking
relief from that sovereign.' 5 The Act allows a private party to
most conservative social and economic systems, which are otherwise thoroughly capi-
talist, occasionally resort to nationalizing certain industries. See Dellapenna, Suing
Foreign Governments and Their Corporations: Sovereign Immunity, Part I, 85 COM. LJ. 167,
171 (1980).
For a colorful account of one Tennessee "hill country lawyer" and his unantici-
pated legal battle with the Japanese government and the Japanese electrical power
generating industry, see Panel, Litigating the Immunity of Foreign Sovereigns: Selected
Problems of Presenting Your Case in the Courts and the Executive Branch, 1976 PROC. AM.
Soc'Y INT'L L. 41, 41-42 (remarks by Mr. Brower).
11. S. 1071, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. S5370 (daily ed. May 3,
1985) (remarks by Sen. Mathias).
12. See National City Bank of New York v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356
(1955) (Frankfurter, J.) "The freedom of a sovereign from being haled into court as
a defendant has impressive title-deeds. Very early in our history this immunity was
recognized, and it has become part of the fabric of our law." Id. at 358 (footnotes
omitted). For a more detailed discussion of the sovereign immunities doctrine, see
infra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
13. See Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, [1977] 2 W.L.R.
356. The Court of Appeal in Trendtex noted:
A consequence of the doctrine of immunity is that in protecting sovereign
bodies from the indignities and disadvantages of adverse judicial process, it
operates to deprive other persons of the benefits and advantages of that
process in relation to rights which they possess and which would otherwise
be susceptible of enforcement.
Id. at 384; see also, 1976 Hearings, supra note 10, at 27 (testimony of Monroe Leigh,
Legal Advisor, Department of State). "The law should not permit the foreign state to
shift these everyday burdens of the marketplace onto the shoulders of private par-
ties." Id.
14. Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611
(1980)).
15. See H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 6604 [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT]. The primary purpose
of the FSIA, as stated in its introduction, is "to provide when and how parties can
maintain a lawsuit against a foreign state or its entities in the courts of the United
States and to provide when a foreign state is entitled to sovereign immunity." Id. at
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pursue claims against a foreign sovereign in certain situations,
but grants immunity to the sovereign, as well as its agencies or
instrumentalities, in other situations. 16 For the most part, the
Act has met the goal of establishing a fair balance between the
two competing notions."
However, with respect to prejudgment attachment of for-
eign assets in the United States, the FSIA decidedly favors the
foreign sovereign by drastically limiting those instances in
which a plaintiff may resort to this important provisional rem-
edy.' 8 The availability of prejudgment attachment is vital in in-
ternational litigation, because of the vast quantities of foreign
sovereign assets in the United States' 9 and the distinct possi-
6604; see also Comment, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: The Use of Pre-judgment
Attachment to Ensure Satisfaction of Anticipated Judgments, 2 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 517,
517-18 (1980). "The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA) was
designed to balance the interests of private litigants with commercial or tortious
claims against foreign states with the interests of the United States in minimizing
friction with foreign nations." Id. (foonotes omitted); see Comment, The Foreign Sover-
eign Immunities Act of 1976: Giving the Plaintiff His Day in Court, 46 FORDHAM L. REV.
543, 566 (1977). "The Act attempts to compromise between the two evils of leaving
the prevailing litigant with a legally useless judgment and executing upon the assets
of a foreign state to the serious detriment of good international relations." Id.
16. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604-11; see infra notes 78-87 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 80-89 and accompanying text (discussing the numerous situa-
tions in which the sovereign immunity defense will be denied). Upon signing the
House bill into law, President Ford issued the following statement explaining the
mutual benefits to private parties and foreign sovereigns:
This legislation will enable American citizens and foreign governments
alike to ascertain when a foreign state can be sued in our courts. In this
modern world where private citizens increasingly come into contact with
foreign government activities, it is important to know when the courts are
available to redress legal grievances.
This statute will also make it easier for our citizens and foreign govern-
ments to turn to the courts to resolve ordinary legal disputes. In this re-
spect, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act carriers forward a modern and
enlightened trend in international law. And it makes this development in
the law available to all American citizens.
Statement by the President on Signing H.R 11315 Into Law, October 22, 1976, 12
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1554 (Oct. 25, 1976).
18. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(d). Section 1610(d) of the FSIA governs prejudgment at-
tachment of foreign sovereign assets. For a detailed discussion of this provision, see
infra notes 129-41 and accompanying text.
19. See LaBella, The Iranian Litigation: Implications for American Business Interests, 3
CARDOzO L. REV. 195, 199 (1982). Since the end of World War II, there has been a
dramatic rise in total foreign investments in the United States. See UNITED STATES
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 803 (105th ed.
1985) (comparison of 1950 foreign investment level with the 1983 level). Today
there are almost U.S.$900 billion of foreign assets in the United States. UNITED
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bility of a foreign sovereign removing those assets as a result
of a crisis in foreign relations.20 If a private claimant is denied
the prejudgment attachment remedy, foreign sovereigns may
remove their assets with impunity and thereby thwart any hope
of the private claimant executing its judgment.2'
The American Bar Association recently called for revision
of the prejudgment attachment provision, along with a number
of other sections of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.22
Since the American Bar Association proposals, amendments to
several sections of the FSIA have been proposed in Con-
23gress. These amendments, which would greatly enhance the
interests of the private claimant, are contained in Senate bill S.
1071.24 If Congress passes S. 1071 the prejudgment attach-
ment provision will receive a much needed and most signifi-
cant alteration.25
STATES BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, Survey of Current Business, June 1985, at 26.
Much of this investment is carried on by foreign governments or governmental agen-
cies. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACTS OF THE UNITED STATES, supra, at 803.
20. Removal of foreign sovereign assets from the United States is a very real
possibility. For instance, in November, 1979, diplomatic relations between the
United States and Iran deteriorated to a point where the Iranian government an-
nounced that it would remove all of its assets from the United States. See infra notes
145-51 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Iranian crisis and subsequent
events. Although the Iranian crisis may have been prompted by unique circum-
stances, the likelihood of a similar crisis arising in the future can not be overlooked.
See LaBella, supra note 19, at 199. "[T]o suggest that the Iranian situation presented
the type of diplomatic, political and legal crisis not likely to reoccur represents a most
dangerous naivete." Id.
21. See Nichols, The Impact of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act on the Enforcement of
Lenders' Remedies, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 251, 259. The FSIA creates many rights. See
infra notes 74-77 and accompanying text. These rights, though, can easily be nulli-
fied in the absence of the prejudgment attachment remedy. As one commentator has
explained:
Even if a creditor surmounts the various hurdles the FSIA puts in the way of
post-judgment execution, virtually all of the foreign government's movable
property likely will have been removed from the United States by the time a
court orders execution. Thus, most creditors will seek a prejudgment at-
tachment at the same time that they file their complaint.
Nichols, supra, at 259.
22. American Bar Association Section of International Law and Practice, Report
to the House of Delegates, August 1984 [hereinafter cited as ABA REPORT].
23. S. 1071, 99th Cong. 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. S5371 (daily ed. May 3,
1985). S. 1071 is entitled "Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act Amendments." Id.
24. See infra notes 100-11 and accompanying text for a brief explanation of each
proposed amendment.
25. See S. 1071, sec. 4, 131 CONG. REC. S5372; see also infra notes 185-98 and
accompanying text (analysis of this proposed amendment).
PREJUDGMENT ATTACHMENT AND FSIA
This Note will focus on the proposed amendment con-
tained in S. 1071 that would strengthen prejudgment attach-
ment of foreign assets. Part I will discuss the doctrine of sover-
eign immunity as it has developed in this country,26 and its
present status in the field of United States international litiga-
tion.2" Part II of the Note will examine the prejudgment at-
tachment remedy in light of these sovereign immunity devel-
opments.2 8 Part III will analyze the proposed amendment
dealing with prejudgment attachment. 29 Finally, the Note will
conclude that the United States Congress should adopt the
proposed prejudgment attachment provision. By doing so,
Congress would remove a formidable obstacle from interna-
tional litigation, and thus enable many private claimants to en-
sure a meaningful recovery.30
I. EVOLUTION OF THE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
DOCTRINE IN THE UNITED STATES
In general, "[s]overeign immunity is a doctrine of interna-
tional law under which domestic courts, given the proper cir-
cumstances, will relinquish jurisdiction over a foreign state. ' 13
This immunity extends to government agencies and instru-
mentalities, as well as to the state itself.3 2 The doctrine of sov-
ereign immunity, in one form or another, has traditionally
been an integral and widely-recognized aspect of foreign rela-
26. See infra notes 31-70 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 71-111 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 115-83 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 184-98 and accompanying text.
30. See infra text following note 198 (conclusion).
31. Jet Line Services, Inc. v. M/V Marsa El Hariga, 462 F. Supp. 1165, 1168-69
(D. Md. 1978). Another court has defined sovereign immunity as a doctrine that
"precludes a litigant from asserting an otherwise meritorious cause of action against
a sovereign or a party with sovereign attributes unless the sovereign consents to the
suit." Principe Compania Naviera, S.A. v. Board of Commissioners, 333 F. Supp.
353, 355 (E.D. La. 1971).
Sovereign immunity is an affirmative defense. See Corporacion Venezolana de
Fomento v. Vintero Sales Corp., 477 F. Supp. 615, 619 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), remanded
on other grounds, 629 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1980). If a defendant fails to plead sovereign
immunity, the defendant implicitly waives any right to this defense and is barred from
claiming sovereign immunity later in the action. Id.
32. See Sucharitkul, Immunities of Foreign States Before National Authorities, 149
RECUEIL DES COURs 87, 100-01 (Academie de Droit International des Cours) (1976).
Because of practical considerations, a state must act through subsidiary entities.
These will usually include persons, representatives, instrumentalities, corporations
1986]
302 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 9:295
tions.3  In the United States the doctrine has slowly
progressed from an absolute form34 to a much more restrictive
form that attempts to balance the interests of the private claim-
ant with those of the sovereign entity.
35
A. Absolute Sovereign Immunity
In its most extreme form sovereign immunity mandates
that courts of one sovereign state should not entertain a suit
against another sovereign state.3 6 Absolute immunity is
and government departments. "Such agencies being part and parcel of the State are
generally accorded the same immunity as the State they represent." Id. at 100.
The following list is a sampling of those entities that may invoke the sovereign
immunity defense under the proper circumstances:
a) the state itself,
b) its head of state and those designated by him as members of his official
party,
c) its government or any government agency,
d) its head of government and those designated by him as members of his
official party,
e) its foreign minister and those designated by him as members of his offi-
cial party,
f) other public ministers, officials and agents of the state with respect to acts
performed in their official capacity if the effect of exercising jurisdiction
would be to enforce a rule of law against the state,
g) a corporation created under its laws and exercising functions comparable
to those of a department of agency of the state.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 66
(1962).
33. For broad discussions of foreign sovereign immunity see E. ALLEN, THE PO-
SITION OF FOREIGN STATES BEFORE NATIONAL COURTS (1933); G.M. BADR, STATE IM-
MUNITY: AN ANALYTICAL AND PROGNOSTIC VIEW (1984); J. SWEENEY, THE INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY (1963).
Much of the early law of foreign sovereign immunity evolved from the rules gov-
erning the sovereign's immune status before the courts of his own territory. This
immunity was explained in a nineteenth century English decision, Feather v. The
Queen, 122 Eng. Rep. 1191 (1865). The decision held that:
[A] petition of right in respect of a wrong, in the legal sense of the term,
shews no right to legal redress against the Sovereign. For the maxim that
the King can do no wrong applies to personal as well as to political wrongs;
and not only to wrongs done personally by the Sovereign .... but to inju-
ries done by a subject by the authority of the Sovereign.
Id. at 1205.
34. See infra notes 36-48 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 49-70 and accompanying text.
36. J. SWEENEY, supra note 33, at 20. There is one notable exception to this
absolute position. Even under the absolute theory of sovereign immunity, a state is
still subject to the judicial process of another state for claims involving an interest in
immovable or real property located in the territory of that other state. See, e.g.,
Storelli c. Governo della Repubblica Francese (Trib. Civ., Rome 1924), 17 Rivista di
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granted out of respect for the dignity and independence of
every sovereign state.3 7 Traditionally, advocates of the abso-
lute form also believed that a strict application of the doctrine
best served the interests of international comity. 38
The United States adhered to this absolute theory of sov-
ereign immunity until the mid-twentieth century.39 The
Supreme Court firmly entrenched the doctrine into United
States law with its famous decision in The Schooner Exchange v.
McFadden.40  This case involved an admiralty proceeding
brought by the alleged owners of a ship.4" They claimed that
the ship had been "violently and forcibly taken by certain per-
sons, acting under the decrees and orders of Napoleon, Em-
peror of the French."42 The two United States claimants ar-
gued that they, and not the French Navy, were rightful owners
of the ship.43
The Court nevertheless dismissed the action,44 and or-
diritto internazionale (1925) 236, 240; 1924 Giurisprudenza italiana 206, translated in
26 AM.J. INT'L L. 589 (Supp. 1932). "The very fact of acquiring and owning, on the
part of one State, part of the territory of another State .... implies a consent by the
former to the exercise of jurisdiction by the latter with respect to such immovables
... Id.
37. See J. SWEENEY, supra note 33, at 20. In Compania Naviera Vascongado v.
Steamship "Christina," [1938] A.C. 485, 490, Lord Atkin explained: "[T]he courts of
a country will not implead a foreign sovereign, that is, they will not by their process
make him against his will a party to legal proceedings whether the proceedings in-
volve process against his person or seek to recover from him specific property or
damages." See also The Parliament Belge, 5 P.D. 197, 217 (1880) (courts should re-
fuse to exercise jurisdiction over another government "as a consequence of the abso-
lute independence of every sovereign authority").
38. See J. SWEENEY, supra note 33, at 20 (translating the 1849 French case of
Spanish Government v. Lambege et Pujol) (one nation can not assert jurisdiction in
litigation involving another nation without seriously impairing their mutual rela-
tions).
39. See generally R. LILLICH, THE PROTECTION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 3-44
(1965) (brief history of sovereign immunity in the United States prior to the enact-
ment of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act).
40. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812) (Marshall, C.J.). Even prior to the ratification
of the United States Constitution and the creation of the federal court system, the
doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity had been recognized in at least one state. See
Moitez v. The South Carolina, Bee 422, 17 F. Cas. 574 (Admiralty Ct., Pa., 1781)
(No. 9,697).
41. The Schooner Exchange v. McFadden, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
42. Id. at 117.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 146-47.
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dered the vessel released to the French.45 The Court justified
its decision by emphasizing one of the traditional grounds of
sovereign immunity, namely respect for the independence of
every sovereign state.46 Subsequent courts4 7 affirmed this no-
tion of sovereign immunity throughout the nineteenth century
and into the early twentieth century.4"
B. Limited Sovereign Immunity
By the mid-twentieth century a new and more limited con-
cept of sovereign immunity emerged in the United States.4 9
The grant of immunity became a discretionary matter to be
handled by the Executive, rather than the Judicial, branch of
government.50 Specifically, the United States Department of
State would resolve immunity questions.5" Courts deferred
consideration of any claim involving a foreign sovereign until
the State Department expressed its opinion.52
Limited sovereign immunity first surfaced as law in the
45. Id.
46. Id. at 137. Chief Justice Marshall wrote:
One sovereign being in no respect amenable to another; and being bound
by obligations of the highest character not to degrade the dignity of his na-
tion, by placing himself or its sovereign rights within the jurisdiction of an-
other, can be supposed to enter a foreign territory only under an express
license, or in the confidence that the immunities belonging to his independ-
ent sovereign station, though not expressly stipulated, are reserved by im-
plication, and will be extended to him.
47. See, e.g., L'Invincible, 14 U.S. (1 Wheaton) 238 (1816). In this case the
Supreme Court held that United States courts have no jurisdiction to redress any
alleged torts committed on the high seas by a cruiser regularly commissioned by a
friendly foreign power. Id. at 252. Other courts further extended the immunity priv-
ilege adopted in The Schooner Exchange. See The Roseric, 254 F. 154 (D.N.J. 1918):
The [absolute] privilege was based on the idea that the sovereign's property
devoted to state purposes is free and exempt from all judicial process to
enforce private claims. Such idea is as cogently applicable to an unarmed
vessel employed by the sovereign in the public service as it is to one of his
battleships.
Id. at 158; accord, Berizzi Bros. Co. v. S.S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926).
48. See Hervey, The Immunity of Foreign States When Engaged in Commercial Enter-
prises: A Proposed Solution, 27 MIcH. L. REV. 751 (1929) (discussing and criticizing
United States adherence to the absolute theory).
49. See R. LILLIcH, supra note 39, at 9-15.
50. See Jessup, Has the Supreme Court Abdicated One of its Functions?, 40 AM.J. INT'L
L. 168 (1946); Comment, The Jurisdictional Immunity of Foreign Sovereigns, 63 YALE L.J.
1148, 1155-59 (1954).
51. Jessup, supra note 50, at 169.
52. Id.; see, e.g., Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945); Ex Parte
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1943 Supreme Court case, Ex Parte Republic of Peru.53 As in The
Schooner Exchange, this case involved the seizure of a foreign
vessel.54 In Ex Parte Republic of Peru, though, the Supreme
Court based its decision on a different justification of sover-
eign immunity than in The Schooner Exchange.55 The Court
noted that judicial deference was necessary in cases involving a
foreign sovereign entity5 6 to prevent embarrassment of the ex-
ecutive arm of the Government. 57 The Supreme Court af-
firmed its new stance toward the doctrine of sovereign immu-
nity two years later in Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman.58 As evi-
denced by these and other cases,59 the Supreme Court had
accepted a sovereign immunity theory by the end of World
War II that was essentially a "political question restriction" on
Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943) (both cases discussed infra at notes 53-58 and
accompanying text).
53. 318 U.S. 578 (1943).
54. Ex Parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943). Plaintiff in this case, a Cu-
ban corporation, instituted an in rem admiralty proceeding against the Ucayali, a Pe-
ruvian steamship, for failing to transport a cargo of sugar to New York. Id. at 580.
55. See supra note 46.
56. 318 U.S. at 587-88. After concluding that the sovereign immunity rule set
out in The Roseric and Berizzi Bros., see supra note 47, should govern this action, the
Court added that "[u]pon recognition and allowance of the claim by the State De-
partment..., it is the court's duty to surrender the vessel and remit the libelant to
the relief obtainable through diplomatic negotiations." 318 U.S. at 588 (citations
omitted).
57. Id. Ex Parte Republic of Peru was authored by Chief Justice Stone, who five
years earlier as Associate Justice, had referred in dictum to the new method of solv-
ing sovereign immunity problems in Compania Espanola de Navegacion Maritima,
S.A. v. The Navemar, 303 U.S. 68 (1938). In Ex Parte Republic of Peru, the Chief Jus-
tice converted his Navemar dictum into holding and asserted that "courts are required
to accept and follow the execution determination that the vessel is immune [from
jurisdiction]." 318 U.S. at 588 (emphasis added). Allowing courts to exercise juris-
diction over a foreign sovereign posed serious problems for the United States Gov-
ernment. Deferring to the Executive branch, according to this Court, would mini-
mize any potential friction between the United States and a foreign government. Id.
at 588-89.
58. 324 U.S. 30 (1945). Chief Justice Stone again wrote the opinion for the
Court. Reiterating his reasoning in Navemar and Ex Parte Republic of Peru, the Chief
Justice concluded that if the United States Government saw fit to allow sovereign
immunity, then it was beyond the power of the courts to deviate from this opinion.
Id. at 35.
59. See, e.g., United States of Mexico v. Schmuck, 294 N.Y. 265, 62 N.E.2d 64
(1945) (New York courts precluded from deciding case by State Department determi-
nation of immunity for Mexican Government corporation); F.W. Stone Engineering
Co. v. Petroleos Mexicanos, 352 Pa. 12, 42 A.2d 57 (1945) (Pennsylvania court re-
fuses to question State Department decision that defendant corporation is an agency
of Mexican Government).
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the judicial process. 60
C. Restrictive Sovereign Immunity
The United States adopted a modern, more restrictive
view of sovereign immunity when the State Department issued
the so-called "Tate Letter" on May 19, 1952.61 According to
this restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, the sovereign re-
mains immune from suit with regard to its public or "sover-
eign" acts, but not with respect to its private acts.62 As a result
of the "Tate Letter," the restrictive theory of sovereign immu-
nity replaced the absolute theory as the preeminent rule gov-
erning disputes between a private United States party and a
foreign sovereign.6 3
This decisive shift in policy is attributable to two major
factors. First, by 1952 foreign governments were engaging in
a wider scope of commercial activity than could ever have been
60. Von Mehren, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 17 COLUM. J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. 33, 40 (1978).
61. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser of the United States Depart-
ment of State, to Acting Attorney General Robert Perlman (May 19, 1952), reprinted in
26 STATE DEP'T BULL. 984 (1952). The State Department had been reconsidering its
policy of granting immunity to foreign government owned and operated merchant
vessels for some time. See Bishop, New United States Policy Limiting Sovereign Immunity,
47 AM.J. INT'L L. 93 (1952).
62. 26 STATE DEP'T BULL. at 984. The "Tate Letter" raised the issue of which
acts of a sovereign should be characterized as public acts and therefore be protected
under the restrictive theory of foreign sovereign immunity. The leading case in the
United States concerning this matter is Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria General
de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S.
934 (1965). In that case, the Second Circuit created its own classification of public
acts for which the court would thereafter grant immunity:
1) internal administrative acts,
2) legislative acts, such as nationalization,
3) acts concerning the armed forces,
4) acts concerning diplomatic activity, and
5) public loans.
336 F.2d at 360.
63. See Note, The American Law of Sovereign Immunity Since the Tate Letter, 4 VA. J.
INT'L L. 75, 81-95 (1964). The "Tate Letter" concludes: "It will hereafter be the
Department's policy to follow the restrictive theory of sovereign immuunity in the
consideration of requests of foreign governments for a grant of sovereign immu-
nity." 26 STATE DEP'T BULL. at 984. One commentator has labelled this shift in
thought "the bright dawn of the doctrine of relative immunity." Timberg, Sovereign
Immunity, State Trading, Socialism and Self-Deception, in EssAYs ON INTERNATIONAL JURIS-
DICTION 40, 46 (1961).
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contemplated at the time of The Schooner Exchange.64 The crea-
tion of government-operated trade monopolies by socialist re-
gimes was responsible in large part for this phenomenon.65
Second, by 1952 the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity
had been adopted by most nations,66 and clearly constituted
the prevailing rule of international law. 67 The two foreign af-
fairs justifications for extending immunity, preserving interna-
tional comity and avoiding embarrassment of the executive
branch, no longer existed to as great an extent.68 Instead,
64. See R. LILLICH, supra note 39, at 5-9. The Schooner Exchange was decided at a
time when the activities engaged in by a government encompassed far less than they
do today. The idea that a sovereign state might engage in typical commercial activity
was alien to international law. "[I]t is highly unlikely that [Chief Justice] Marshall
intended to formulate a principle broad enough to bestow immunity upon acts not
then envisioned as properly performable by a sovereign." Id. at 5; see also Trendtex
Trading, [1977] 2 W.L.R. 356. In this case, Lord Shaw explained:
The radical changes in political and economic and sociological concepts
since the first world war have falsified the very foundations of the old doc-
trine of sovereign immunity. Governments everywhere engage in activities
which although incidental in one way or another to the business of govern-
ment are in themselves essentially commercial in nature. To apply a univer-
sal doctrine of sovereign immunity to such activities is more likely to dis-
serve than to conserve the comity of nations on the preservation of which
the doctrine is founded.
Id. at 385-86.
65. See Fensterwald, Sovereign Immunity and Soviet State Trading, 63 HARV. L. REV.
614 (1950). It is no coincidence that nations began adopting the radical, restrictive
theory of sovereign immunity shortly after the emergence of the Soviet Union as an
international force in the 1920's. The Soviet Government rather than private parties
conducted all international trade with other nations. Thus, adherence to the abso-
lute doctrine of sovereign immunity could have prevented parties from ever having
disputes arising out of commercial transactions with the Soviet Union decided in a
court of law. Id.; see also E. ALLEN, supra note 33, at 301-02. "Courts that had never
before assumed jurisdiction over an unwilling foreign state tore aside the veil and
saw beneath the garments of the sovereign a powerful economic competitor of na-
tional business firms .... "
66. For a detailed survey of the status of sovereign immunity throughout the
world at the time of the "Tate Letter," seeJ. SWEENEY, supra note 33, at 26-41; Gar-
cia-Mora, The Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity of Foreign States and its Recent Modifications,
42 VA. L. REV. 335, 344-54 (1956).
67. See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 701-02
(1976). By adopting the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, the United States
accepted a doctrine that most nations already considered an obligation of interna-
tional law. Bishop, supra note 61, at 95.
68. See Trendtex Trading, [1977] 2 W.L.R. at 385-86. "It is no longer necessary or
desirable that what are truly matters of trading rather than of sovereignty should be
hedged about with special exonerations and fenced off from the processes of the law
by the attribution of a perverse and inappropriate notion of sovereign dignity." Id. at
386. In fact, the interests of maintaining friendly foreign relations may be less
308 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 9:295
these justifications were overridden by the more prominent
economic and political considerations stemming from the ex-
pansion of governments into purely private areas. 69 Although
the Supreme Court never officially adopted the restrictive the-
ory, the Court did declare, just months prior to the passage of
the FSIA, that "it is fair to say that the 'restrictive theory' of
sovereign immunity appears to be generally accepted as the
prevailing law in this country."70
D. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
In 1976, the United States Congress codified the doctrine
of sovereign immunity with the passage of the Foreign Sover-
eign Immunities Act. 7 ' In addition to adopting the restrictive
theory of sovereign immunity, 72 and thereby following the lead
of the State Department and numerous courts, 73 the FSIA
threatened when the rights and obligations of foreign states growing out of their
commercial transactions are made a matter ofjudicial concern rather than a matter of
diplomatic concern. The Pesaro, 277 F. 473, 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
69. See supra notes 64-65; see also Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria General de
Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354, 357, cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965).
"[B]ecause of the dramatic changes in the nature and functioning of sovereigns, par-
ticularly in the last half century, the wisdom of retaining the [absolute] doctrine has
been cogently questioned." Id.
70. Alfred Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 703.
71. See supra note 14. Legislation was previously introduced in the House of
Representatives in 1973. The bill was subsequently withdrawn for reconsideration.
See H.R. 3493, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., 119 CONG. REC. 2880 (1973). The 1976 Act was
the result of a combined effort of the Justice Department, State Department, Con-
gress, the private bar, and the academic community. 1976 Hearings, supra note 10, at
27 (remarks of Monroe Leigh).
The structure of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act is as follows:
§ 1602: Findings and declaration of purpose
§ 1603: Definitions
§ 1604: Immunity of a foreign state from jurisdiction
§ 1605: General exceptions to the jurisdictional immunity of a foreign
state
§ 1606: Extent of liability
§ 1607: Counterclaims
§ 1608: Service; time to answer; default
§ 1609: Immunity from attachment and execution of property of a foreign
state
§ 1610: Exceptions to the immunity from attachment or exception
§ 1611: Certain types of property immune from execution
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-11.
72. See HousE REPORT, supra note 15, at 6605.
73. In Alfred Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 703, the Supreme Court noted the many cases
in which the restrictive theory had been adopted:
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made three other important changes that enhanced the inter-
ests of the private claimant.
First, the FSIA transferred the task of deciding the immu-
nity question from the State Department back to the courts,7 4
thus minimizing foreign relations considerations and adding a
measure of predictability to United States sovereign immuni-
ties law.7 5 Second, the FSIA provided the first statutory
method for serving process on, and obtaining in personamju-
risdiction over, foreign parties.7 6 Finally, the Act removed what
had previously been an absolute immunity from execution
against the property of a foreign sovereign.77
Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria General, 336 F.2d 354 (2nd Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965); Petrol Shipping Corp. v. Kingdom of
Greece, 360 F.2d 103 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 931 (1966); Premier
S.S. Co. v. Embassy of Algeria, 336 F. Supp. 507 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Ocean
Transport Co. v. Government of Republic of Ivory Coast, 269 F. Supp. 703
(E.D. La. 1967); ADM Milling Co. v. Republic of Bolivia, Civ. Action No. 75-
946 (D.C. Aug. 8, 1975); Et Ve Balik Kuruma v. B.N.S. International Sales
Corp., 25 Misc. 2d 299, 304 N.Y.S.2d 971 (1960); Harris & Co. Advertising,
Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 127 So.2d 687 (Fla. Ct. App. 1961).
Id.
74. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 15, at 6606. The preamble to the Act states:
"Claims of foreign states to immunity should henceforth be decided by courts of the
United States and of the States in conformity with the principles set forth in this
chapter." 28 U.S.C. § 1602. This result has been acclaimed as the depoliticization of
international litigation. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 15, at 6634 (quoting a letter
from Robert S. Ingersoll, Deputy Secretary of State, and Harold R. Tyler, Jr., Deputy
Attorney General, to Hon. Carl 0. Albert, Speaker of the House of Representatives
(October 31, 1975)).
75. See New England Merchants National Bank v. Iran Power Generation and
Transmisson Co., 502 F. Supp. 120, 124 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). Even after the State De-
partment issued the "Tate Letter" and adopted the restrictive theory of sovereign
immunity, for political reasons it occasionally requested immunity for disputes aris-
ing out of purely commercial acts of the foreign sovereign. See, e.g., Isbrandtsen
Tankers, Inc. v. President of India, 446 F.2d 1198 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985
(1971); Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A., 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961) (State Department
issued a suggestion of immunity soon after concluding delicate negotiations with
Fidel Castro regarding the return of a hijacked United States airliner). Rich has been
classified as "one of the international legal monstrosities of American courts for the
1960's." R. LILLICH, supra note 39, at 17.
76. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 15, at 6606. The FSIA revised section 1330 of
title 28 and, in effect, established a federal long-arm statute reaching foreign sover-
eigns and sovereign entities. Id. at 6612. Section 1608 of the Act provides for vari-
ous means of serving process on foreign parties, all intended to cure the traditional
problems of serving foreign sovereign parties. 28 U.S.C. § 1608.
77. See HousE REPORT, supra note 15, at 6606. Section 1610 permits execution
against a foreign sovereign's property when the property is used for commercial ac-
tivity, see infra note 88, and when 1) the foreign sovereign has either implicitly or
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The FSIA recognizes a presumption of immunity for all
foreign states and their agencies or instrumentalities.78 This
presumption may then be defeated in a number of ways.79
Sovereign immunity will not be granted if the suit involves:
1) a waiver of immunity by the foreign state,8" 2) rights to
property seized in violation of international law8 ' or located in
the United States, 82 3) certain torts not involving a discretion-
ary function,8 3 4) related counterclaims 8 4 or set-offs,8 5 or, most
significantly, 5) a commercial act of the foreign state.8 6 Once
the private claimant has defeated the presumption of sovereign
immunity, a suit against the foreign sovereign can proceed. 7
explicitly waived immunity from execution, or 2) the property is or was used for the
commercial activity upon which the claim is based, or 3) the execution relates to a
judgment establishing rights in property taken in violation of international law, or
4) the execution relates to a judgment establishing rights in property which is
(a) acquired by succession or gift, or (b) immovable and situated in the U.S. and not
used for diplomatic purposes, or 5) the property consists of an obligation or pro-
ceeds from an obligation to indemnify or hold harmless the foreign state or its em-
ployees contained in an automobile or other liability insurance policy. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1610(a)(1-5). For a discussion of the pre-FSIA law on execution on foreign sover-
eign property, see infra notes 124-28 and accompanying text.
78. 28 U.S.C. § 1604; see Kline v. Republic of El Salvador, 603 F. Supp. 1313
(D.D.C. 1985). "Under the Act, a foreign state is immune from suit, and the courts
lack jurisdiction, unless a specific statutory exception is found to be applicable." Id.
at 1315. The FSIA defines "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" as any en-
tity
(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof,...
and
(3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States .... nor created
under the law of any third country.
28 U.S.C. § 1603(b).
79. See generally Dellapenna, supra note 10, at 167 (methods of defeating pre-
sumption of sovereign immunity discussed).
80. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1). Waiver of immunity can occur by declaration of the
foreign state, by international agreement, by contract, by instituting suit in another
country, or by intervening in a proceeding. See J. SWEENEY, supra note 33, at 55.
81. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3).
82. Id. § 1605(a)(4).
83. Id. § 1605(a)(5).
84. Id. § 1607(b).
85. Id. § 1607(c).
86. Id. § 1605(a)(2). This concept of "commercial act" is the equivalent of"pri-
vate act" referred to in the "Tate Letter," supra note 62 and accompanying text.
87. See Kline, 603 F. Supp. at 1315. While Congress' first priority in passing the
FSIA was to aid private United States parties, the Supreme Court in Verlinden B.V. v.
Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480 (1983), held that foreign plaintiffs were equally
entitled to bring suit against foreign sovereigns.
PREJUDGMENT A TTACHMENT AND FSIA
Furthermore, if the private claimant does obtain a judgment,
property of a foreign state used for commercial activity88 in the
United States will no longer enjoy immunity from execution."9
The FSIA was a welcome piece of legislation when it was
passed." The Act represented an important legislative at-
tempt to correct the imbalance between the private claimant
and the foreign sovereign.9 For the most part, it was a clear
attempt to promote the interests of the private claimant seek-
ing redress,9 2 oftentimes at the expense of the foreign sover-
eign seeking immunity.9 3 In this respect, the FSIA continued
the trend favoring the private claimant, rather than the foreign
sovereign. In fact, the primary impetus behind the present call
to amend the FSIA is the desire to further promote the interests
of the private claimant. 94
E. Proposed Amendments to the FSIA
One court has called the FSIA "a marvel of compres-
sion," '9 5 because of its relative brevity. However, in the ten
88. The FSIA defines commercial activity as "either a regular course of commer-
cial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act." 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d). If
the activity out of which a claim arises is one in which a private person could engage,
then sovereign immunity will no longer be granted. Texas Trading & Milling Corp.
v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981).
89. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(1-5).
90. See Atkeson, Perkins, Wyatt, H.R. 11315-The Revised State-Justice Bill on For-
eign Sovereign Immunity: Timefor Action, 70 AM.J. INT'L L. 298 (1976); Maier, The Pro-
posed Sovereign Immunities Act: Its Effect on Judicial Deference, 1976 PROC. AM. Soc'Y INT'L
L. 48.
There were some critics who opposed the restrictive theory embodied by the
FSIA for varying reasons. Compare 1976 Hearings, supra note 10, at 61-67 (remarks of
Professor Michael Cardozo) (politics should not be taken out of the decision to grant
or deny immunity) with Chemical Natural Resources, Inc. v. Republic of Venezuela,
420 Pa. 134, 194, 215 A.2d 864, 893, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 822 (1966) (Musmanno,J.,
dissenting) (foreign sovereign immunity is "a colossal effrontery .... a shameless
fraud" and should be completely abolished).
91. See supra note 15.
92. 1976 Hearings, supra note 10, at 27 (remarks of Monroe Leigh). The FSIA
does not, however, promote the interests of the private claimant in the area of pre-
judgment attachment. See infra notes 134-39 and accompanying text.
93. See Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 506 F. Supp. 981
(N.D. Il1. 1980). One of the primary purposes of the FSIA was to remove the sover-
eign immunity defense when foreign states engaged in private commercial activity,
thereby placing them on the same footing as private parties engaging in international
trade. Id. at 987.
94. See S. 1071, 131 CONG. REC. S5371 (remarks of Sen. Mathias).
95. Texas Trading, 647 F.2d at 306.
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years since its enactment, it has become quite apparent that
"[t]his economy of decision has come.., at the price of con-
siderable confusion in the district courts."96 To rectify this
confusion, the United States Senate introduced S. 1071 on
May 3, 1985. 97 Its primary goal is to "fill the gaps in the
FSIA;"98 its main effect would be to strengthen a private claim-
ant's position in any legal dispute with a foreign sovereign or
sovereign entity.99
One of the proposed amendments to the FSIA would ex-
pressly redefine "commercial activity" to encompass debt se-
curities issued and guaranteed by foreign states.'0 0 Another
would remove the sovereign immunity barrier in an action
brought against a foreign entity to enforce an arbitral agree-
ment or award.' 0 ' A third amendment would eliminate the use
of the "act of state" defense by a foreign state in cases in which
the FSIA confers authority on the courts to adjudicate claims
for expropriation or breach of contract. 10 2
The amendments would also greatly enhance execution of
judgments. Instead of limiting execution on the foreign state
property to that property out of which the claim arises, as does
the current FSIA provision, 10 3 one proposed amendment
would sanction execution on any property, regardless, of
96. Id. at 307. For a brief overview of the perceived problems, see ABA REPORT,
supra note 22, at 3-6.
97. See supra note 23.
98. S. 1071, 131 CONG. REC. S.5370 (introductory remarks of Sen. Mathias). S.
1071 incorporates most of the recommendations offered by the American Bar Associ-
ation Section of International Law and Practice in its 1984 report. See supra note 22.
As an introduction to its recommendations, the Section noted that in the time it has
been in force, the FSIA has generally been successful in achieving its primary pur-
poses of removing the political considerations that often deprived the private claim-
ant of his just desserts, and implementing the modern, restrictive theory of sovereign
immunity. See ABA REPORT, supra note 22, at 3. However, the Section added that a
number of significant problems have emerged under the Act as currently drafted,
requiring further action by Congress. Id.
99. See infra notes 100-11 and accompanying text.
100. S. 1071, sec. 1, 131 CONG. REC. S5371 (amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1603).
101. Id. sec. 2(a), 131 CONG. REC. S5371 (amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)).
102. Id. sec. 3, 131 CONG. REC. S5371-72 (amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1606).
The "act of state" doctrine mandates that the courts of one nation will not pass judg-
ment on the governmental acts of another nation done within the latter's own terri-
tory. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401 (1964).
103. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(2).
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whether the claim is based on use of that property.'04 The sole
requirement is that this property must be "used or intended to
be used for a commercial activity in the United States."'0 5 A
fifth proposed amendment would affect admiralty claims by re-
ducing the penalty for wrongful arrest of a foreign state ves-
sel,10 6 and by allowing a claimant to pursue an action in rem
against a foreign state vessel.'0 7 This provision would elimi-
nate much of the uncertainty that exists under the current
law. 108
Finally, one amendment would significantly advance the
use of prejudgment attachment of foreign sovereign assets lo-
cated in the United States.' 09 The proposed amendment
would prevent a foreign sovereign agency or instrumentality
from removing these assets prior to execution,' ° as long as
certain enumerated conditions are met."' The proposed pre-
judgment attachment provision deserves special attention in
light of the importance of prejudgment attachment as a protec-
tive remedy, 1 12 the limitations imposed on its use up to this
time,"' and the apparent confusion surrounding the present
status of the FSIA prejudgment attachment provision."'
104. S. 1071, sec. 4(2), 131 CONG. REC. S5372 (amendment to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1610(a)).
105. Id.
106. Id. sec. 2(b), 131 CONG. REC. S5371 (amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1605(b)).
Currently the FSIA's maximum penalty for wrongful arrest is the value of the vessel
of cargo. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(b). This proposed amendment would restrict the maxi-
mum penalty to an award of damages incurred during the wrongful detention.
107. S. 1071, sec. 2(b), 131 CONG. REC. S5371 (amendment to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1605(b)).
108. Id., 131 CONG. REC. S5371 (remarks of Sen. Mathias). Many of the
problems currently affecting admiralty law arise from the difficulty in determining the
true owner of the vessel and from the obvious mobility of these vessels. Id. Senator
Mathias summed up the reasons behind this particular provision when he added that
"[l]itigants in U.S. courts should not have to watch helplessly as their only remedy
sails away." Id.
109. Id. sec. 4(11), 131 CONG. REC. S5372 (amendment to § 1610(d)).
110. See infra notes 184-88 and accompanying text.
111. See infra notes 194-98 and accompanying text.
112. See infra note 116 and accompanying text.
113. See infra notes 120-41 and accompanying text.
114. See infra notes 142-83 and accompanying text.
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III. DEVELOPMENT OF PREJUDGMENT ATTACHMENT
IN THE UNITED STATES
Prejudgment attachment of foreign property has tradition-
ally been a delicate area in international litigation."t 5 It is un-
doubtedly one of the most potent and effective provisional
remedies available to a private claimant to ensure legal redress
in an action brought against a foreign party. 1 6 Prejudgment
attachment, however, can also be a serious and often irritating
infringement on a nation's sovereignty. 1 7 A compromise must
be achieved between promoting the interests of the aggrieved
claimant, 1 18 and protecting the interests of a foreign sover-
eign. t 19
A. Prejudgment Attachment Prior to the FSIA
From 1952, when the Executive branch of the United
States Government officially adopted the restrictive theory of
sovereign immunity, 120 until Congress enacted the FSIA in
1976,121 the State Department and the courts only allowed pre-
judgment attachment of foreign assets for limited purposes. 122
Property owned by a foreign sovereign or sovereign entity
115. See infra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text. Unlike post-judgment reme-
dies, provisional remedies such as prejudgment attachment offer the aggrieved claim-
ant a substantial measure of relief without having tried the merits of the action. See
New England Merchants National Bank v. Iran Power Generation and Transmission
Co., 502 F. Supp. 120, 126-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). It has also been asserted that "the
attachment presents a potent pain in the neck to the debtor, who may then see the
pitfalls of deadbeatdom and ante up the money owed plaintiff." R. HAYDOCK, D.
HERR &J. STEMPEL, supra note 1, at 532. Most significantly, however, without pre-
judgment attachment the claimant may be left with a worthless judgment. See supra
note 21.
117. See infra note 131 and accompanying text; see also Irving Trust Company v.
Government of Iran, 85 F.R.D. 135 (E.D. La. 1980). "Relief in the form of an attach-
ment is a harsh remedy and runs contrary to the fundamental concept that a person's
property should not be taken from him before he has been given an opportunity for
the proper adjudication of his rights." Id. at 137; see New England Merchants, 502 F.
Supp. at 127 ("the provisional remedies are too potentially harassing to be freely
granted").
118. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
121. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
122. See Miller, Services of Process on State, Local, and Foreign Governments under Rule
4, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-Some Unfinished Business for the Rulemakers, 46 F.R.D.
101, 126-27 (1969).
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could be attached for the purpose of establishing jurisdiction
over the sovereign. 123 Courts, though, refused to allow attach-
ment of foreign sovereign assets for security purposes because
such property remained completely immune from execution of
judgment.2 4
Opposition to attachment in aid of execution stemmed
from the old sovereign immunity cases 25 and their respect for
the independence of every sovereign state. 1 26 The State De-
partment continued to oppose execution on foreign sovereign
property, and therefore attachment in aid of execution, despite
adopting the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity and ex-
pressly recognizing that many sovereign states were expanding
the breadth of their government activities. 12 7 Immunity from
123. See Stephen v. Zivnostenska Banka, 15 A.D.2d 111, 115-16, 222 N.Y.S.2d
128, 134 (1961), aff'd, 12 N.Y.2d 781, 235 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1962) (State Department sup-
ports attaching foreign sovereign property in the United States in order to obtain
jurisdiction "where under international law a foreign government is not immune
from suit").
124. See Stephen, 15 A.D.2d at 116, 222 N.Y.S.2d at 134 (quoting State Depart-
ment letter of suggestion).
[P]roperty so attached to obtain jurisdiction over the defendant government
cannot be retained to satisfy a judgment ensuing from the suit because in
accordance with international law the property of a foreign sovereign is im-
mune from execution even in a case where the foreign sovereign is not im-
mune from suit.
Id.
The United States had long recognized that foreign government property is im-
mune from execution under international law. See Dexter & Carpenter, Inc. v. Kun-
gligJarnvagsstyrelsen, 43 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1930). "The clear weight of authority in
this country, as well as that of England and Continental Europe, is against all
seizures, even though a valid judgment has been entered." Id. at 708; see also Brad-
ford v. Chase Nat. Bank of City of New York, 24 F. Supp. 28, 38 (S.D.N.Y. 1938)
(plaintiff prohibited from executing on deposits at a national bank belonging to the
Phillipine government), aft'd sub nom. Berger v. Chase Nat. Bank of City of New York,
105 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1939), afftd, 309 U.S. 632 (1940).
125. See supra notes 40-48 and accompanying text.
126. See Oliver American Trading Co. v. Government of the United States of
Mexico, 5 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1924). In this case the Second Circuit vacated an attach-
ment issued against the Mexican Government, explaining:
The property sought to be reached in this country is the public property of
Mexico ... , which that government holds for public purposes, and, being
such, it is entitled to the same immunity as a sovereign, or an ambassador,
or a ship of war, and for the same reason. The exercise of such jurisdiction
by the courts of this country is inconsistent with the independence and sov-
ereignty of Mexico.
Id. at 667.
127. See Flota Maritima Browning de Cuba, Sociadad Anonima v. Motor Vessel
Ciudad de la Habana, 335 F.2d 619, 626 (4th Cir. 1964) (State Department still sug-
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execution was extended regardless of whether the foreign sov-
ereign entity engaged in public or private activity.' 28
This approach deprived the prejudgment attachment rem-
edy of most of its potency. Even if the claimant was likely to
prevail, there was no benefit in preventing a foreign sovereign
from removing its assets when those assets were immune from
execution.
B. Prejudgment Attachment Under the FSIA
By providing comprehensive service of process rules, 29
the FSIA eliminated the tactic of attaching foreign sovereign
assets to obtain jurisdiction. 3 ' This technique had under-
standably created a great deal of friction between the United
States Government and foreign states.' 3 ' However, by reduc-
ing the instances in which a court can grant immunity from
execution, 132 the Act created the potential for utilizing pre-
gests that foreign sovereign property remain immune from execution even after the
"Tate Letter"); New York and Cuba Mail Steamship Company v. Republic of Korea,
132 F. Supp. 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). "[T]he principle of the immunity of a foreign
government's property from attachment and seizure is not affected by the State De-
partment's favorable attitude towards the restrictive theory of sovereign immu-
nity .... Id. at 686.
128. See New York and Cuba Mail, 132 F. Supp. at 685 (immunity from execution
granted despite State Department finding that sovereign activity was of a private na-
ture).
129. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
130. See supra note 123 and accompanying text. In preventing attachment for
jurisdictional purposes, the United States Congress expressly recognized that private
parties could initiate litigation in United States courts merely upon the fortuitous
presence of foreign sovereign property in the United States. Geveke & Co. Interna-
tional, Inc. v. Kompania Di Awa I Elektrisidat Di Korsou N.V., 482 F. Supp. 660, 662-
63 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
131. See Panel, New Departures in the Law of Sovereign Immunity, 1969 PROC. AM.
Soc'Y INT'L L. 182 (remarks of MurrayJ. Belman, Deputy Legal Adviser, Department
of State):
American litigants are often very ingenious in securing jurisdiction over for-
eign governments. It is not uncommon for the large New York banks to
receive notices of attachment of a foreign government's accounts. I have
even seen a case where a plaintiff sought to attach the New York accounts of
all the commercial banks of a foreign country on the ground that any dollar
assets held by those banks must represent deposits of the foreign govern-
ment itself.
Id. at 184; see also 1976 Hearings, supra note 10, at 31 (testimony of Bruno Ristau,
Chief, Foreign Litigation Section, Civil Division, Department ofJustice). "[F]oreign
states whose property is attached invariably protest to the State Department." Id.
132. See supra note 77.
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judgment attachment to its fullest advantage. Preventing the
sovereign from removing its assets from the jurisdiction be-
comes a significant matter when a claimant can execute on for-
eign sovereign assets. Thus, in considering whether to permit
prejudgment attachment of foreign sovereign assets, the draft-
ers of the act were once again faced with "walking the tight-
rope" 3 3 between protecting foreign relations and promoting
the private interests of litigants.
The FSIA provision as enacted allows a private claimant to
attach foreign sovereign assets prior to judgment when 1) the
foreign sovereign has explicitly waived its immunity from pre-
judgment attachment, and 2) valid justifications for the attach-
ment exist. 134 Requiring an explicit waiver of immunity affords
the foreign sovereign entity a great deal of protection,1 5 and
erects an imposing barrier in the path of the private litigant.13 6
133. Comment, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: The Use of Pre-Judgment Attach-
ment to Ensure Satisfaction of Anticipated Judgments, 2 Nw. J. Irr'L L. & Bus. 517, 518
(1980).
134. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(d). This section of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act provides:
The property of a foreign state, as defined in section 1603(a) of this chapter,
used for a commercial activity in the United States, shall not be immune
from attachment prior to the entry of judgment in any action brought in a
court of the United States or of a State, or prior to the elapse of the period
of time provided in subsection (c) of this section,
if-
(1) the foreign state has explicitly waived its immunity from attachment
prior to judgment, notwithstanding any withdrawal of the waiver the foreign
state may purport to effect except in accordance with the terms of the
waiver,
and
(2) the purpose of the attachment is to secure satisfaction of a judgment
that has been or may ultimately be entered against the foreign state, and not
to obtain jurisdiction."
Id. The FSIA provision on prejudgment attachment could be considered a liberal
compromise compared to an earlier sovereign immunity bill submitted. See Burrows
& Newman, Prejudgment Attachment-Sovereign Immunity, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 23, 1982, at 1,
col. 1, 30, col. 1. That earlier bill, H.R. 3493, submitted by Rep. Peter Rodino on
January 31, 1973, did not permit any prejudgment attachment for security purposes
whatsoever. See H.R. 3493, 93rd Cong. 1st Sess., 119 CONG. REC. 2880 (1973).
135. The ABA Section of International Law and Practice pointed out the ineq-
uity of this provision in its Report to the House of Delegates. ABA REPORT, Supra
note 22, at 4. "This gap in the statutory scheme has the potential to render nugatory
the access to the courts and the right of execution provided elsewhere in the statute,
since a foreign state sued under the Act is free to remove its assets from the jurisdic-
tion with impunity." Id.
136. See 1976 Hearings, supra note 10, at 81 (testimony of Cecil J. Olmstead,
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This protection from prejudgment attachment is not ex-
tended to private firms engaging in commercial activity in the
United States. 137 Yet, a foreign sovereign or, more signifi-
cantly, a foreign sovereign agency or instrumentality, is pro-
tected from prejudgment attachment even though it carries on
virtually the same activity as the private firm.' 3 8 As a result, the
ability to collect an anticipated judgment depends largely on
whether the foreign sovereign entity honors the judgments
against it, or whether it removes its assets from the jurisdiction
while the litigation is pending. 39
The claimant may seek to find an explicit waiver by the
foreign sovereign, but outright waiver of immunity from pre-
judgment attachment by the sovereign is unlikely. 40 Even in
Chairman, The Rule of Law Committee, and Vice President, The Texaco Co.). Dur-
ing the subcommittee hearings on the FSIA bill that was eventually enacted, a
number of organizations expressed concern over the restrictions placed on the pro-
tective remedy. See id.; see also id. at 98 (testimony of Michael Marks Cohen, Attorney
and Chairman of the Committee on Maritime Legislation of the Maritime Law Asso-
ciation of the United States). These groups stressed that although section 1610(d) of
the Act permits prejudgment attachment where the foreign sovereign explicitly
waives its immunity, this exception is so narrow that it virtually eliminates the use of
the provisional remedy against a foreign sovereign entity. One spokesman criticized
the provision as a complete loss of prejudgment attachment and arrest remedies in
actions brought against foreign sovereigns. 1976 Hearings, supra note 10, at 98.
137. See supra note 1.
138. See 28 U.S.C. § 1610(d).
139. See 1976 Hearings, supra note 10, at 76. This precarious situation was dis-
cussed at the subcommittee hearings, and a few spokesmen voiced their apprehen-
sion. See, e.g., id. at 76 (letter submitted by the Committee on International Law of
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York). If the foreign sovereign property
is removed prior to the entry ofjudgment, the newly created right to execute on that
property would be seriously impaired. Id.
140. Many of the numerous treaties governing trade between the United States
and foreign nations contain waiver of immunity clauses. None of these clauses, how-
ever, contain the exact words "prejudgment attachment." Rather, parties to these
treaties have agreed to waive immunity from vague concepts such as "other liability."
See, e.g., Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Nov. 28, 1956, United
States-Republic of Korea, art. XVIII, para. 2, 8 U.S.T. 2217, 2230, T.I.A.S. No. 3947;
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Mar. 27, 1956, United States-
Netherlands, art. XVIII, para. 2, 8 U.S.T. 2043, 2073, T.I.A.S. No. 3942; Treaty of
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Jan. 21, 1956, United States-Nicaragua, art.
XVIII, para. 3, 9 U.S.T. 449, 463, T.I.A.S. No. 4024; Treaty of Friendship, Com-
merce and Navigation, Oct. 29, 1954, United States-Federal Republic of Germany,
art. XVIII, para. 2, 7 U.S.T. 1839, 1859, T.I.A.S. No. 3593; Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation, Apr. 2, 1953, United States-Japan, art. XVIII, para. 2, 4
U.S.T. 2063, 2077, T.I.A.S. No. 2863; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Naviga-
tion, Aug. 3-Dec. 26, 1951, United States-Greece, art. XIV, para. 5, 5 U.S.T. 1829,
1867, T.I.A.S. No. 3057.
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those situations in which explicit waiver arguably exists, courts
have, for the most part, been unwilling to find explicit
waiver. 1 ' Therefore, it is highly improbable that a private
claimant can obtain prejudgment attachment of foreign sover-
eign assets under the present FSIA, even when the need to at-
tach these assets is obvious.
C. Judicial Handling of the Section 1610(d) Explicit
Waiver Requirement
One of the key factors in reducing the effectiveness of the
prejudgment attachment provision of the FSIA has been the
difficulty encountered by the courts in interpreting that provi-
sion. Courts have struggled to determine what constitutes an
explicit waiver of immunity, 142 and have reached conflicting
conclusions. 43  Moreover, courts have frequently construed
the term "explicit waiver" strictly, 144 thereby depriving the pri-
vate claimant of the minimal opportunity for protective attach-
ment that the FSIA provides.
The Iranian crisis of 1979145 prompted a myriad of civil
141. See infra note 144 and accompanying text.
142. See, e.g., Reading & Bates Corp. v. National Iranian Oil Co., 478 F. Supp.
724, 728 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Behring International, Inc. v. Imperial Iranian Air Force,
475 F. Supp. 383, 392-93 (D.N.J. 1979); Electronic Data Systems v. Social Security
Organization of Iran, 79 Civ. 1711 (S.D.N.Y. June 12) (order of attachment), re-
manded, 610 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1979); see also infra notes 158-73 and accompanying text
(discussion of Reading & Bates, Behring and Electronic Data Systems).
143. Compare, e.g., American International Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of
Iran, 493 F. Supp. 522, 525 (D.D.C. 1980) (waiver of immunity found in treaty be-
tween United States and Iran) with E-Systems, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 491 F.
Supp. 1294, 1301-02 (N.D. Tex. 1980) (no explicit waiver found in same treaty).
144. See, e.g., S & S Machinery Co. v. Masinexportimport, 706 F.2d 411,416 (2d
Cir. 1983) ("[wle do not take lightly the congressional demand for explicitness");
Banque Compafina v. Banco de Guatemala, 583 F. Supp. 320, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)
(finding an explicit waiver requires a "Talmudic" analysis of treaty language); see infra
notes 180-83 and accompanying text; Reading &Bates, 478 F. Supp. at 728 ("or other
liability" can not be read as explicit waiver); infra notes 169-73.
145. In the fall of 1978, business and diplomatic ties between the United States
and Iran became strained as internal political unrest grew in Iran. N.Y. Times, Sept.
10, 1978, at 82. Soon thereafter United States business and nonessential diplomatic
personnel began to leave Iran in increasing numbers. Americans' Exodus From Iran
Spurred By Carter Decision, N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 1978, at Al, col. 4. On November 4,
1979, a group of Iranian students seized'the United States Embassy in Teheran tak-
ing United States diplomatic and military personnel hostage. Teheran Students Seize
U.S. Embassy and Hold Hostages, N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1979, at Al, col. 6. Ten days
later, President Jimmy Carter responded by issuing an executive order freezing all
assets belonging to the government of Iran and subject to the jurisdiction of the
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suits 4 6 by diverse claimants. 4 7 Most of these cases named the
Iranian Government or an agency of that Government as the
defendant. 4 ' With the impending threat of the complete re-
moval of all Iranian Government assets from the United
States, 149 many of these claimants sought prejudgment attach-
United States. Gwertzman, Carter Freezes Billions in Iranian Assets as Khomeini Regime
Tries to Withdraw Them, N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1979, at Al, col. 6. With all political and
economic ties severed, enormous diplomatic and legal problems were unleashed. See
generally Norton & Collins, Reflections on the Iranian Hostage Settlement, 67 A.B.A.J. 428
(1981) (overview of significant legal and diplomatic aspects of the Iranian crisis).
146. See New England Merchants National Bank v. Iran Power Generation and
Transmission Co., 495 F. Supp. 73, 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). "The volatile political situa-
tion in Iran together with the break in the long-standing economic and industrial
contacts between American businesses and the Iranian government, its agencies, in-
strumentalities, as well as private Iranian corporate entities, have caused a flood of
lawsuits to be filed in this and other circuits." Id.
A number of lawsuits had been filed prior to the hostage seizure, most of which
involved attempts to enjoin United States banks from making payment on standby
letters of credit issued in favor of the Iranian government, or one of its agencies. See
Getz, Enjoining the International Standby Letter of Credit: The Iranian Letter of Credit Cases,
21 HARV. INT' L.J. 189, 248-52 (1980). After the hostage seizure, though, United
States courts were inundated with suits filed against the Iranian government and its
agencies. See Security Pacific National Bank v. Government and State of Iran, 513 F.
Supp. 864, 866 n. I (C.D. Cal. 1981) ("over 400 such suits pending in courts through-
out the country ... claims in these suits total over several billion dollars").
147. Included among the many claimants filing suit against the Iranian govern-
ment were an airline, see Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Bank Melli Iran, 79
Civ. 1190 (S.D.N.Y. March 30, 1979), an accounting firm, see Touche Ross & Co. v.
Iran, 80 C. 0128 (C.D. Cal. 1980), and a university. See Trustees of Columbia Univ. v.
Iran, 80 Civ. 0241 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
148. See, e.g., Gulf Ports Crating Company v. Ministry of Roads and Transporta-
tion, 674 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1982); Jafari v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 539 F. Supp.
209 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Marschalk Company, Inc. v. Iran National Airlines Corp., 518 F.
Supp. 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Hawaiian Agronomics Company (International) v. Gov-
ernment of Iran, 518 F. Supp. 596 (C.D. Cal. 1981); Mashayekhi v. Iran, 515 F. Supp.
41 (D.D.C. 1981); Electronic Data Systems Corporation Iran v. Social Security Or-
ganization of the Government of Iran, 508 F. Supp. 1350 (N.D. Tex. 1981); Interna-
tional Schools Service v. Government of Iran, 505 F. Supp. 178 (D.N.J. 1981); Grove
Valve & Regulator Co., Inc. v. Iranian Oil Services Ltd., 87 F.R.D. 93 (S.D.N.Y.
1980).
149. On November 14, 1979, Dr. Abolhassan Bani-Sadr of the Iranian Revolu-
tionary Council announced that Iran intended to remove all of its assets from United
States banks and their overseas branches. Kifner, Iran Defends Move to Withdraw
Funds, N.Y. Time, Nov. 15, 1979, at 1, col. 5.
Originally, the value of Iranian assets in the United States was estimated to be
approximately U.S.$6 billion. Farnsworth, Action Disturbs Financial Circles; U.S. Stresses
Protection of Claims, N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1979, at Al, col. 3. That figure was later
raised to U.S.$8 billion, Value of Frozen Assets Now Put at $8 Billion, N.Y. Times, Nov.
20, 179, at A13, col. 2, and eventually raised to a point in excess of U.S.$10 billion.
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ment of Iranian property in the United States;' 0 In response,
the defendants in these actions invoked the doctrine of sover-
eign immunity. 5' Consequently, the Iranian crisis cases af-
forded United States courts their first opportunity to interpret
the FSIA provision on prejudgment attachment. 5 2 In doing
so, however, the courts were unable to reach a consensus re-
garding the interpretation of explicit waiver. 153
While the FSIA states that foreign government property in
the United States shall be immune from prejudgment attach-
ment except as provided in section 1610(d), 54 it does add that
this clause is "[s]ubject to existing international agreements to
which the United States is a party at the time of enactment of
this Act. . . ,,t55 The federal courts deciding the Iranian crisis
cases were faced with interpreting not only the prejudgment
attachment provision, but also the Treaty of Amity, Economic
Relations, and Consular Rights Between the United States of
America and Iran 5 6 (Treaty of Amity). In article XI(4) of this
Treaty each party waived any immunity from "taxation, suit,
execution ofjudgment or other liability .... ",I Thus, the courts
Powell, Iran Accord Establishes Fund of $1 Billion to Pay Claims of U.S. Firms and Citizens,
Wall St.J., Jan. 20, 1981, at 3, col. 1.
150. See, e.g., Gulf Ports Crating, 674 F.2d at 319; Marschalk, 518 F. Supp. at 731;
Hawaiian Agronomics, 518 F. Supp. at 596; Security Pacific National Bank, 513 F. Supp. at
866.
151. See supra note 150. Each of the cases listed supra at note 150 involved a
claimed defense of sovereign immunity.
152. From January 19, 1977, when the FSIA came into effect, until the Iranian
crisis, no reported cases attempted to interpret section 1610(d) of the Act. In one
case, Amoco Overseas Oil Co. v. Compagnie Nationale Algerienne de Navigacion,
459 F. Supp. 1242 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), an agency of the Algerian Government sought to
invoke section 1610(d) to prevent attachment. The district court explained that sec-
tion 1610(d) did not apply since a default judgment had been entered against the
defendants prior to the effective date of the FSIA. Id. at 1248.
153. See infra notes 158-73 and accompanying text. For a general overview of
judicial handling of the prejudgment attachment cases arising out of the crisis, see
Comment, Prejudgment Attachment of Iranian Assets in the U.S.: Waiving Sovereign Immu-
nity, 13 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 675 (1981); Note, Prejudgment Attachment of Frozen
Iranian Assets, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 837 (1981); Note, Two Interpretations of Immunity from
Prejudgment Attachment Under The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 6 N.C. J. INT'L L. &
CoM. REG. 151 (1980-81).
154. 28 U.S.C. § 1609.
155. Id.
156. Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights, Aug. 15, 1955,
United States-Iran, 8 U.S.T. 901, T.I.A.S. No. 3853 [hereinafter cited as Treaty of
Amity].
157. Id. at 909 (emphasis added). The Treaty provides in part:
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were faced with the further task of reconciling the strict, ex-
plicit waiver requirements of the FSIA prejudgment attach-
ment provision with this preexisting treaty and its waiver of
immunity.
In the first of the Iranian prejudgment attachment cases,
Electronic Data Systems Corp. Iran v. Social Security Organization of
Iran,15 8 the plaintiff brought suit against various agencies and
instrumentalities of the Government of Iran, claiming breach
of an executory contract. The plaintiff also sought to attach
defendant's funds deposited in a New York bank.' 59 The court
granted the attachment order, concluding that the waiver pro-
vision in the Treaty of Amity was sufficiently explicit to consti-
tute a waiver of Iran's immunity from prejudgment attachment
under section 1610(d) of the FSIA. 160 Shortly after the Elec-
tronic Data Systems decision, two similar cases were decided.
These two cases and Electronic Data Systems were each decided
on divergent reasoning.' 6'
In the first of these two cases, Behring International, Inc. v.
Imperial Iranian Air Force, 162 the district court found that article
XI(4) of the Treaty of Amity did not constitute the explicit
waiver of immunity from prejudgment attachment required by
section 1610(d) of the FSIA. 16 ' Nevertheless, the court went
on to note that the strict waiver requirements of the FSIA did
not abrogate the Treaty of Amity' 64 because the FSIA was ex-
No enterprise of either High Contracting Party, including corporations, as-
sociations, and government agencies and instrumentalities, which is publicly
owned or controlled shall, if it engages in commercial, industrial, shipping
or other business activities within the territories of the other High Con-
tracting Party, claim or enjoy, either for itself or its property, immunity
therein from taxation, suit, execution ofjudgment or other liability to which
privately owned and controlled enterprises are subject therein.
Id., art. XI(4), 8 U.S.T. at 909.
158. 79 Civ. 1711 (S.D.N.Y. June 12) (order of attachment), remanded, 610 F.2d
94 (2d Cir. 1979).
159. Id. at 1.
160. Id. at 2-3.
161. See LaBella, supra note 19, at 208-14.
162. 475 F. Supp. 383 (D.N.J. 1979). Behring involved a suit brought by an inter-
national freight forwarder to recover the expenses for services rendered to the de-
fendants. The plaintiff, "faced mostly with unknowns," id. at 387, received a writ of
attachment of defendant's property located at the Behring warehouse in Edison, New
Jersey. Id.
163. Id. at 393.
164. Id. at 393-94.
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pressly made subject to any preexisting treaties. 165 After em-
phasizing that under the Treaty Iran had waived its immunity
from "taxation, suit, execution of judgment, or other liability to
which privately owned and controlled enterprises are subject therein,"'66
the court concluded that the Treaty contained an implicit waiver
of immunity from prejudgment attachment. 67 The court thus
denied defendants' motion for release of its property. 16
In the second case, Reading & Bates Corp. v. National Iranian
Oil Co.,169 the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York rejected the analysis of both Behring and
Electronic Data Systems and refused to confirm an order of at-
tachment. 70 The court found that 1) in order for a sovereign
to waive its immunity from attachment, it must do so explic-
itly 171 and that 2) the Treaty of Amity did not satisfy this re-
quirement. 172 This court, in direct opposition to the Behring
court, reasoned that the "other liability" language of the
Treaty could not be construed as a waiver of immunity from
prejudgment attachment. t 73
Thus, in three cases with virtually identical facts, the
courts issued vastly differing opinions.'74 The courts never
had the opportunity to reconcile these distinctive interpreta-
tions of explicit waiver. The Algerian Accords entered into by
the United States and Iran on January 19, 1981 terminated all
pending Iranian litigation. 75 All legal debates arising out of
165. Id.
166. Id. at 394 (emphasis in original).
167. Id. at 394-95.
168. Id. at 396. The court found that even though section 1610(d) requires an
explicit waiver of immunity from prejudgment attachment, this immunity may never-
theless be implicitly waived by treaty. Id. at 394; see also Reading & Bates, 478 F. Supp.
at 728 (analysis of this reasoning).
169. 478 F. Supp. 724 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
170. Id. at 729.
171. Id. at 728.
172. Id. at 729.
173. Id. The court explained: "It is hard to imagine that a sovereign nation, in
entering a treaty supposedly to promote commerce, would at the same time even
suggest that it would evade a lawful judgment arising out of its commercial activi-
ties." Id.
174. For a general discussion of these cases, see McGreevey, The Iranian Crisis
and U.S. Law, 2 Nw.J. INT'L L. & Bus. 384, 400-11 (1980).
175. Declaration of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, Jan. 19,
1981, reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 224 (1981). All disputes between American nationals and
the Government of Iran would be resolved by an international arbitral tribunal.
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the crisis, including the prejudgment attachment questions,
were eventually rendered moot by the United States Supreme
Court's opinion in Dames & Moore v. Regan.'76
The issue of interpreting the FSIA prejudgment attach-
ment provision was resurrected, however, shortly thereafter in
litigation unrelated to the Iranian crisis. In one post-crisis
case, Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica,' 77 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held
that the defendant had explicitly waived its sovereign immunity
from prejudgment attachment. ' 78 The court found that the re-
quirements of section 1610(d) had been met when the bank
signed notes worth U.S.$40 million containing a waiver of any
right to immunity from "legal proceedings."'' 79
Less than a year after Libra Bank, the Second Circuit
reached a different result in S & S Machinery Co. v. Masinexpor-
timport,180 a case involving an immunity clause similar to the
one in Libra Bank. 8' In contrast to its decision in Libra Bank,
the court in S & S Machinery found that waiver from "other
liability" in a treaty between the United States and Romania
did not amount to explicit waiver under FSIA section
1610(d). 182 In view of these conflicting cases, it is evident that
some legislative action must be taken to resolve this confu-
176. 453 U.S. 654 (1980). In Dames & Moore the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutional and statutory authority of the President to implement an agreement
such as the Algerian Accords. Id. at 674.
177. 676 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1982). For a detailed examination of the Libra
Bank decision, see Burrows & Newman, Prejudgment Attachment-Sovereign Immunity,
N.Y.L.J., Apr. 23, 1982, at 1, col. 1.
178. 676 F.2d at 50.
179. Id. at 49-50. The exact words "explicit waiver" were not necessary under
section 1610(d) where, as in this case, the parties' intention was unambiguous.
180. 706 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1983).
181. Id. at 416-17. The waiver clause contained in the United States-Romania
trade agreement stated that each party waived immunity "from suit or execution of
judgment or other liability in the territory of the other Party with respect to commer-
cial or financial transactions .... Id. at 417 (citing Agreement on Trade Relations
Between the United States and the Romanian Government, April 2, 1975, art. IV,
para. 2, 26 U.S.T. 2305, 2308-09, T.I.A.S. No. 8159).
182. Id. at 418. Because of the "delphic character of the phrase 'other liabil-
ity,' " the court refused to find that the Romanian Bank and Masin had explicitly
waived their immunity from prejudgment attachment. See also O'Connell Machinery
Company, Inc. v. M.V. "Americana," 734-F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1984) ("any other liabil-
ity" provision in the treaty between the United States and Italy did not constitute
waiver of immunity from prejudgment attachment).
PREJUDGMENT ATTACHMENT AND FSIA
sion.18 3
III. PREJUDGMENT ATTACHMENT UNDER S. 1071
The proposed amendment of the FSIA prejudgment at-
tachment provision 84 would have two major effects. First, it
would eliminate much of the confusion surrounding the pres-
ent prejudgment attachment provision. Second, it would
greatly increase the potential use of this provisional remedy
and further the interests of all private litigants who fear the
removal of foreign government-owned assets in the United
States.' 8 5 The proposed amendment recognizes the economic
realities prevailing in many foreign nations by distinguishing
between foreign government property and property of a for-
eign government agency or instrumentality engaging in com-
mercial activity in the United States.' 8 6 With regard to the
property of a foreign government, the proposed amendment
would retain the existing requirement of explicit waiver for
prejudgment attachment. 8 7 However, no waiver, explicit or
implicit, would be required under the proposed amendment in
order to attach property of any agency or instrumentality of a
foreign government as long as the agency or instrumentality
has engaged in commercial activity in the United States.' 88 Em-
183. This confusion was further highlighted by a more recent case, Banque
Compafina v. Banco de Guatemala, 583 F. Supp. 320 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). As in Libra
Bank, the defendant had signed a number of bank notes, some of which contained a
section waiving any immunity "relative to any action or proceeding deriving from this
promissory note .. " Id. at 324. Unlike Libra Bank, though, this court found the
phrase did not constitute an explicit waiver of immunity from prejudgment attach-
ment under § 16 10(d). Id. at 325; see Burrows & Newman, Central Bank Property: Pro-
tection From Attachment, N.Y.Lj., Apr. 20, 1984, at 1, col. 1 (general discussion of the
Banque Compafina decision).
184. S. 1071, sec. 4(11), 131 CONG. REC. S5372. Section 1610 of title 28, United
States Code, is amended by adding at the end thereof the following:
(d)(1) In addition to subsection (c), [formerly § 1610(d)], any property in
the United States of an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state engaged
in commercial activity in the United States shall not be immune from attach-
ment or injunctive relief prior to the entry of judgment in any action
brought in a court of the United States or of a State. ...
Id.
185. Id., 131 CONG. REC. S5371 (remarks by Sen. Mathias). The amended pre-
judgment attachment provision "will provide a better balance between the due pro-
cess of litigants and the foreign policy concerns of the U.S. Government." Id.
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phasizing the importance of this provision, the author of S.
1071 explained, "[w]e don't want litigants in our courts to be
the 'hit and run' victims of an outmoded concept of sovereign
immunity. '"189
Although the proposed amendment removes -the strict re-
quirements of the present section 1610(d),' 90 it would not
transform prejudgment attachment into a means of harassing
foreign sovereign entities.' 9 ' Various safety measures con-
tained in S. 1071 protect the legitimate foreign policy concerns
of the United States' while improving the aggrieved claim-
ant's chances of using this vital remedy.
93
The property that the claimant seeks to attach must other-
wise be subject to execution upon the entry of a final judg-
ment. "'94 The purpose of the attachment must be only to se-
cure the satisfaction of a possible judgment and not to obtain
jurisdiction.195 The property of a private party must be subject
to attachment in similar circumstances. 96 The moving party
must post a bond greater than fifty percent of the value of the
property or any higher amount required by applicable law.' 97
Finally, the moving party must show a probability of success on
the merits and a probability that the assets will be removed
from the United States absent prejudgment attachment.'
These conditions should ensure that the prejudgment attach-
ment procedure is not abused.
CONCLUSION
One of the more significant aspects of the FSIA is its rec-
ognition that foreign governments are now engaging in com-
mercial activities that were traditionally carried on by private
parties. In many instances, the Act limits the grant of sover-
189. Id., 131 CONG. REC. S5371 (remarks of Sen. Mathias).
190. See supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text.
191. See ABA REPORT, supra note 22, at 4.
192. See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
193. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
194. S. 1071, sec. 4(11), 131 CONG. REC. S5372.
195. Id.
196. Id. The prerequisites for attaching private property would be determined
by the law prevailing in the jurisdiction where the attached property lies. See supra
note 1.
197. S. 1071, sec. 4(11), 131 CONG. REC. S5372.
198. Id.
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eign immunity extended to a government agency or instru-
mentality carrying out these activities. However, with regard
to prejudgment attachment of foreign sovereign assets to pro-
tect an anticipated judgment, the Act still extends virtually
complete immunity to all sovereign entities. The United States
Congress should conform the prejudgment attachment provi-
sion to the rest of the Act and allow attachment of the assets of
a foreign agency or instrumentality.
Stephen G. Foresta
